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William I. Robinson LADB News Analyst The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of
the Soviet Bloc sparked euphoria in Washington and Miami regarding the "imminent" collapse
of the Cuban government. Exile groups drafted new political constitutions for Cuba, bankers
commissioned studies on investment opportunities and privatization schemes, and presidential
candidates on the campaign trail promised to be the first US head of state to visit a "free Cuba." At
one point in 1990, real estate value plummeted in some Cuban-American neighborhoods in Miami
as proprietors sold belongings in a frenzy in anticipation of their imminent return to post-Castro
Cuba. The euphoria has since passed. Over the past few months, most analysts and politicians have
come to accept the reality that Cuba is not Eastern Europe. The Cuban revolution retains important
political reserves, social support, and a potential for economic recovery, despite the deep and very
palpable crisis jolting the Caribbean island nation. The new administration in Washington is thus
faced with the challenge of developing a mid- and long-term policy toward Cuba based on the more
realistic premise that "Castro's Final Hour" is not yet necessarily at hand. In recent months, a series
of reports and position papers on future policy toward Cuba been have circulating in Washington.
Virtually every policy planning center and think tank of importance "inside the beltway" has
issued new reports or recommendations. Among the most influential are "Cuba in the Americas:
Reciprocal Challenges," released in October 1992 by the Inter-American Dialogue and the mid-1992
Rand Corporation study, "Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist World." Notwithstanding a degree
of diversity in terms of their conclusions, these reports share considerable unity in underlying
criteria a remarkable development given the passions and divisive debates that the issue of Cuba
has historically raised in official power circles. The reports coincide in acknowledging that the
Cuban case is distinct from the Eastern European and Soviet cases and that the Cuban revolution
retains considerable strength and survival potential. In fact, the Rand report describes Cuba as a
"moving target" that will be extremely difficult for US policy makers to "pin down." A review of the
different reports, and recent interviews by this journalist with analysts in Washington and in Cuba,
suggest that policy toward Cuba has, in fact, already undergone major modifications at the level
of conceptualization and that a consensus is beginning to emerge. To be sure, policy toward Cuba
is likely to remain one of the most enigmatic and complex issues in the Clinton administration's
agenda for Latin America. In addition, specific predictions are of little value since policy toward
Cuba will be closely tied to the evolution of events on the island and throughout Latin America.
In particular, the selection of concrete policies to be adopted will depend on the extent to which
the Cuban economy can achieve recovery over the next two years, and whether or not existing
social discontent on the island acquires a political expression. Analysts do not expect Clinton to
give Cuba priority, much less to undertake any significant initiatives, during the first half of his
four year term. Nonetheless, it appears that the operational assumption in Washington is that
the Cuban revolution can, and will, be undermined over the mid-term, and that Washington
stands a better chance than ever in the 1990s of reimposing its historic hegemony over the country.
This would distinguish the current conjuncture from that of the late 1970s, when US and Cuban
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officials dabbled in negotiations over a real modus vivendi. The underlying strategic thrust and
broad outlines of a new Cuba policy would resemble, in many respects, the "Nicaraguan model"
implemented by the Bush administration between 1988-1990. That model was based on shifting US
policy from one based on hard-line external destabilization, to new and more sophisticated forms
of internal political intervention. The rough contours of such a model have already begun to be
applied toward Cuba. Among other aspects, they include: * Anti-communism and national security,
the long- standing banner of US policy toward Cuba, has been discarded in favor of "promotion of
democracy." * The policy focus is shifting from aggressive destabilization from without to political
penetration from within. In this regard, US strategists have acknowledged that one weakness in
policy over the past 30 years has been an emphasis on destabilization from abroad without any
concern for establishing and stabilizing a viable alternative to the revolutionary regime. * This shift
implies an effort to transfer the nucleus of anti-Castro opposition forces from Miami to Cuba in
order to ensure that the opposition campaign becomes headquartered physically and institutionally
inside the country. This shift requires a greater flow of human, material and financial resources and
communications between the United States and Cuba. (This is one reason why the recently passed
Cuban Democracy Act, in addition to tightening the embargo, also contains clauses which propose,
under certain conditions, exemptions for things like phone lines and mail service between the two
countries.) * This shift also means transferring US support from the ultra-right Cuban opposition
groups based in Miami especially Jorge Mas Canosa's Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF) and the CIA-linked paramilitary groups to opposition sectors considered moderate and
centrist, and even leftist, by US standards, such as christian democratic, social democratic, and
even self-proclaimed "democratic socialist" groups. Given the extensive influence wielded by the
CANF, the process of making this shift is bound to be prolonged and uneven. The process is likely
to be expressed through a series of confrontations and power struggles in Miami and Washington.
Although it remains powerful, and its tentacles of political influence reach to the highest levels
in Washington, the Foundation and its rabidly extremist leader are becoming a thorn in the side
of US policy towards Cuba and Latin America. This became evident in the slugfest between the
Foundation and Washington foreign policy officials over the candidacy of Mario Baeza as Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. In the Baeza affair, Mas Canosa exceeded his previous
bounds in terms of influencing US policy toward Cuba by attempting to dictate US policy toward
Latin America as a whole. In doing so, Mas Canosa wound up antagonizing important sectors in
Washington and undermining his own clout. * These policy shifts are expected to reduce the gap
which has traditionally existed between US policy and that followed by governments in Western
Europe and Latin America. These governments have generally pursued "taming" and "coopting"
the revolution through conditional cooperation and subtle pressures, in sharp contrast to the hard-
line US destabilization policies. With the emerging policy shift, Washington will be in a better
position to try and unify European, Latin and North American criteria, and promote a united
"international front" toward Cuba. * Through new modalities of political intervention developed
in recent years, Washington has already begun to promote establishment of a national opposition
network inside Cuba, backed by a broad international support network. The network is currently
centered around several human rights groups. But the architects of the new political intervention
would like to see it expanded to include political parties, trade unions, communications media,
youth and women's groups and civic association. US efforts, especially through the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) which has already spent over US$10 million in recent years in
Cuba programs for these purposes would strive to provide this opposition network with a political
action capacity and a public projection among the Cuban population. * The leadership of such an
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opposition network would be inter-locking, with an array of groups coming together under the
auspices of a common program. It will not be a covert or violent opposition. Its public discourse
will be moderate, even nationalist; it will call not for overthrow of Castro government but for
dialogue, a political opening, and peaceful change. It will raise sensitive issues among the Cuban
population, emphasizing the current economic hardships and the aspirations of Cuba's post-1959
youth generation. The crude anti-communist propaganda of the past will be replaced, on Radio
Marti and elsewhere, by a more sophisticated political discourse. * The call for Washington's version
of "free and fair elections" will be ongoing. Nevertheless, the efforts to build an internal political
opposition will move forward with or without multi-party elections in Cuba. * Washington will
rely heavily on "third country" participation in its policies, for instance, by providing support to
an internal opposition via other Latin American countries, or by making the call for free elections
through multilateral organizations and Latin American governments. * The economic embargo
against Cuba is an essential ingredient of overall policy and will not be lifted. US strategy will seek
to undermine Cuba's efforts at reinsertion into the world economy and penetration of capitalist
markets on the basis of biotechnology, tourism, and agroexport production. This is precisely
the intent behind recent initiatives by US legislators to "internationalize" the embargo through
the United Nations (for additional coverage, see Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs,
02/25/93.) The entire policy will in part hinge on assuring the continuity of Cuba's severe economic
crisis and avoiding any possibility of recovery, since the underlying strategy is to convert economic
crisis into social discontent, and then to give a political expression to that discontent. Such a three-
step sequence from economic crisis to social crisis to political crisis is premised on permanent
economic attrition. This is predicated on maintaining the embargo, while simultaneously achieving
a "demonstration effect" and a sense of "relative deprivation" among the Cuban population through
mass communications. Jack Otero, head of a new AFL-CIO program designed to create an anti-
Castro trade union movement, alluded to this when he asserted in his October 1992 testimony
in Congress in favor of the Cuban Democracy Act: "It's strategy is simple: to present Castro with
a dearth of resources and a flood of ideas." * However, Washington will probably seek certain
exemptions and the lifting of specific aspects of the embargo such as communications, mail services,
and "humanitarian donations" so as to facilitate the flow of human and material resources and
"ideas" into the island. Exactly how economic sanctions against Cuba are to be synchronized with
overall US strategy will probably remain a major point of tactical contention in Washington. The
principal operational obstacle to the emerging US strategy is the Cuban government's refusal
to allow groups tied to the US to operate legally on the island. One possible scenario would be
an opening of negotiations further down the road by the Clinton administration. As part of such
negotiations, the administration would offer to lift elements of the embargo in exchange for a
commitment by the Castro government to allow for the free operation of US- supported opposition
groups on the island. * Cuba's growing external sector, resting on a bifurcated economy an internal
socialist system and an external sector producing for the world capitalist market has already begun
to bring about domestic stratification and social resentment, particularly in the case of foreign
tourism and access by privileged groups to scarce foreign exchange. US strategists will target
the external sector of the bifurcated economy for the cultivation of a social base for the internal
political opposition. The key factor in this emerging new strategy toward Cuba is the evolution of
the Cuban economy (for additional coverage on economic strategy, see Chronicle of Latin American
Economic Affairs, 02/18/93.) Cuban authorities have developed a detailed and theoretically viable
plan for Cuba's reinsertion into the world economy. The plan rests on biotechnology, tourism,
agro-industrial exports, and petroleum exploration. (Geological surveys indicate that significant
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exploitable deposits may exist. The discovery of exploitable deposits would pave the way for Cuba's
access to international credit and accelerate economic recovery even before on-line oil production.)
Cuban authorities are anticipating with some trepidation that the country can weather this "special
period" of deprivation resulting from the "double blockade," the US embargo combined with
withdrawal of Soviet and Eastern European aid and trade. The current economic crisis in Cuba is
indeed acute. But, as this journalist witnessed, for the moment, the population remains nourished
and the health care system intact. In sharp contrast to most third world capital cities, there are
no homeless wandering Havana streets, no shantytowns, no diseased children scrounging for
food morsels, and comparatively little violent crime. Reports in some US newspapers of families
"eating cats" and a generalized resignation to a prolonged state of "collective zombiedom" are
more figments of reporters' imaginations than objective assessments of Cuba's current reality.
Nonetheless, social discontent is now palpable and growing. If the population were to turn against
the revolution, it would not be the result of political opposition but out of simple desperation over
economic conditions. How long the population will endure the current hardships, and what options
the US might face were the economy to recover, are key questions US policymakers now face, on
the basis of a more realistic premise that it is not necessarily "Castro's Final Hour." Highlights from
the Inter-American Dialogue Report on Cuba The report on Cuba issued by the Inter-American
Dialogue merits particular attention, given that many of the group's directors and board members
have assumed positions in the Clinton cabinet. Dialogue President Richard Feinberg now serves
as Director of Latin American affairs at the National Security Council, while Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, as well as Undersecretary of State for Policy Planning Peter Tarnoff, were both
members of the Dialogue board, and Bruce Babbit, now Secretary of the Interior, was a member
of the group's Executive Committee. Recommendations contained in the Dialogue's October 1992
report include: * The Cuban government should "permit free and fair elections, monitored by
internationally accredited observers." * "The governments of Latin America, the Caribbean, and
Canada should strengthen cultural, artistic, and scholarly ties with Cuba and help to open the
island to new ideas. They should also press directly for democratic freedoms and respect for human
rights in Cuba." * "The Organization of American States (OAS) should reinstate Cuba to active
membership when it commits itself to the democratic principles of the Organization's Charter." *
"The President and other senior US officials should continue to make clear that the United States
has no intention of invading Cuba and vigorously [sic] to condemn violent actions by exile groups."
* "The United States should actively promote the free flow of information and ideas to the Cuban
people by exempting from its embargo all transactions that foster communications between the
Cuban people and people from the United States and other countries, including tourism. Beyond
communications and travel, the US government should only ease its embargo in response to positive
steps taken by the Cuban government. Washington can best encourage such steps by working
cooperatively with other governments of the hemisphere and allowing them to take the lead in some
areas." * "In its policy towards Cuba, the United States should give greater weight to humanitarian
concerns by making it easier for charitable groups to deliver food and medicine to the Cuban people
and for Cuban-Americans to assist relatives and friends in Cuba." * "US broadcasting to Cuba must
be responsible. Radio Marti should be a source of objective news, not propaganda, and TV Marti
should be canceled because it violates international conventions."
-- End --
